1. Bankruptcy fraud consists of a knowingly false statement about a material fact made under penalty of perjury and in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding. See United States v. Dantuma, No. rrl-3077, 1998 WL 567939, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 18, 1998) (listing the elements of bankruptcy fraud); see also Clymer v. United States, No. 95-55941, 1996 WL 393510, at *1 (9th Cir. July 9, 1996) (same). In Senate hearings on bankruptcy fraud conducted in 1994, Senator Metzenbaum stressed his concern over the proliferation of bankruptcy fraud:
Annual case filings have climbed from 300,000 in 1980 to 944,000 in 1991 and in excess of $26 billion is at stake in these filings. Commensurate with the rise in filings has been an increase in the number of fraudulent schemes that undermine the goals of Federal bankruptcy. For example, individuals have feigned bankruptcy to avoid debt collection and foreclosure by their creditors. Numerous bank officials and their customers have used the bankruptcy pro cess to shield themselves from discovery or prosecution from fraud. Drug defendants are using bankruptcy filings to frustrate and delay drug asset forfeiture proceedings. Hundreds of typing mills are luring customers with vague promises of solving their credit problems, charging the customer hundreds of dollars while inducing them to sign bankruptcy petitions they often do not understand, and then improperly filing bankruptcy on their behalf.
Department of Justice has placed greater emphasis on federal prose cution of bankruptcy fraud.2 As a result, federal judges are increas ingly applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines")3 to bankruptcy fraud and have begun to implement uniform standards for sentencing defendants convicted of this crime. 4 Congress enacted the Guidelines pursuant to the Sentencing Re 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1998-99) [hereinafter USSG].
4. See Gaumer, supra note 2, at 12. Under the Guidelines, the court determines a de fendant's sentence based on a number of factors including the conduct underlying the charged offense (the "base offense") and any relevant adjustments ("any appropriate spe cific offense characteristics"). See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.1. A sentencing court must first select the Guidelines' base offense provision most applicable to the nature of the crime of conviction in order to determine a numerical value used to calculate the length of a de fendant's sentence (the "base offense level"). See id. § lBl.2 application note 1. In order to guide this determination, the Guidelines include a Statutory Index which provides a list of criminal offenses and the appropriate base offense provision or provisions. See id. Each of these provisions lists a base offense level for the particular offense. See id. ch. 2. These base offense levels may be subject to an upward ("enhancement") or downward ("reduction") adjustment depending on the applicability of specific offense characteristic provisions that describe aggravating or mitigating circumstances. See id. chs. 2-3. After the base offense level is established, the court determines the range of the defendant's sentence by comparing the base offense level to the Sentencing Table. See id. § lBl.l(a)-(g), ch. 5, pt. A. Sentence reductions or enhancements may be appropriate based on specific offender characteristics or specified grounds for departure from the prescribed range. See 6. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). Congress considered pre-Guidelines sen tencing confusing and deceptive in that it required courts to impose indeterminate sentences that could be changed by parole commissions. See id. Pre-Guidelines sentencing also often [Vol. 98:1038 gress attempted to achieve honest sentencing by eliminating parole.7
In order to realize uniformity and proportionality, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission ("Sentencing Commis sion") to devise a sentencing scheme that balances the tension be tween uniform and proportional sentencing. 8 The Sentencing Commission has mandated that courts apply the Guidelines' provisions in a consistent manner in order to maintain this balance.9 Most courts agree that bankruptcy fraud should be sen tenced under section 2F1.1, the Guidelines' base offense provision for fraud.10 Courts disagree, however, about the propriety of applying sec tion 2F1.1(b)(4)(B), one of several enhancement provisions under sec tion 2F1.1, to bankruptcy fraud.11 Section 2F1.1(b)(4)(B) (the "proc ess enhancement") allows a sentencing court to increase a defendanf s sentence if the defendant violates "any judicial or administrative or der, injunction, decree, or process not addressed elsewhere in the guidelines."12 The Sentencing Commission, however, failed to define the word "process" in the text of, or commentary to the Guidelines.13
According to Black's Law Dictionary, there are two potential defi nitions of "process."14 Defined narrowly, "process" means a legal in strument issued by the court and directed at the defendant to inform him of the institution of proceedings against him and to compel his resulted in a "wide disparity in sentences inlposed for similar criminal offenses committed by similar offenders," weakening sentencing uniformity and proportionality. Id.
See id.
8. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(2)-(3), at 1-2 This tension exists because, although the complexity and judicial discretion necessary in a proportional sentencing system undermines sentencing uniformity, the sinlplicity necessary for a uniform sentencing system inlpedes proportional sentencing. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(3), at 2-3.
9. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(2); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 42 (1993) (stating that the Guidelines bind judges); United States v. Harriott, 976 F.2d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 1992 ) (stating that courts should apply the Guidelines as written). Cir. 1997) (same). Note that the cases predating the 1998 amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines refer to section 2Fl.l(b)(3)(B). Under the amendments, this provision was stricken and reenacted as 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B).
12. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l(b )(4)(B) (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Ca"ozzella, 105 F.3d at 800 (discussing the possible definitions of "proc ess"); We lch, 103 F.3d at 908 (same).
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (7th ed. 1999).
appearance.ts Defined broadly, "process" constitutes the "proceed ings in any action or prosecution."t6
The different definitions of "process" affect the scope of the proc ess enhancement. With the narrower definition of "process," the en hancement applies only to situations in which a defendant convicted of fraud has violated a formal legal instrument, such as a summ ons or an order issued by a court and directed specifically at the defendant.17 With the expansive definition, however, the process enhancement would apply to the more extensive range of misconduct known as abuse of process.ts Such conduct "includes any serious misuse of judi cial or administrative proceedings intended to inflict unnecessary costs or delay on an adversary or to confer undeserved advantages on the actor."t9
The Sentencing Commission's failure to define "process" has re sulted in a controversy among several federal circuit courts over the meaning of the process enhancement and its applicability to bank ruptcy fraud.20 The majority of circuits have held that the word "proc ess" should be read broadly and that the phrase "violation of judicial process" in the process enhancement should be interpreted as abuse of process (the "abuse of process argument").2t Thus, several courts have held that because bankruptcy fraud inherently involves abuse of process, it constitutes a violation of the process enhancement even when the defendant has not violated a specific judicial order, injunc tion, or decree.22
15. See id. (defining process as "[a] summ ons or writ, esp. to appear or respond in court").
Id.
17. See Carrozzella, 105 F .3d at 800.
18. See BLACK'S LAW DICfIONARY, supra note 14, at 10 (defining "abuse of process" as the "improper and tortious use of a legitimately issued court process to obtain a result that is either unlawful or beyond the process's scope"). Other circuits have upheld enhancement of a bankruptcy fraud sentence under the process enhancement based on a different ration ale: they rely on the defendant's violation of several bankruptcy rules and forms that mandate truthful and complete disclosure of assets and liabilities by debtors.23 Although such rules and forms are not techni cally instruments issued by a court, several courts have analogized them to court or administrative orders or directives within the mean ing of the process enhancement (the "analogy argument").24 Under this interpretation, the process enhancement would apply to bank ruptcy fraud even if the Sentencing Commission intended "process" to be read narrowly.25
A third group of circuits, however, has held that bankruptcy fraud does not necessarily merit an adjustment pursuant to the process en hancement. 26 The First Circuit has rejected the analogy argument and held that the process enhancement pertains only to defendants who violate a formal legal instrument issued by the court, such as a sum mons or court order.27 Moreover, by analyzing "process" only in its narrow sense, the First Circuit logically foreclosed the abuse of proc ess argument.28 The Second Circuit has explicitly rejected the abuse of process argument in dicta by indicating that in the context of the proc ess enhancement, "process" should be read narrowly. This Note argues that neither the abuse of process argument nor the analogy argument justifies applying the two-level process en hancement to bankruptcy fraud. Rather, sentences should only be en hanced under this provision when defendants violate legal instruments issued by courts or administrative agencies, such as orders or decrees. Part I explains why the abuse of process argument fails to justify ap plying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Part II discusses why the analogy argument also does not justify enhancing the sen tence of a defendant convicted of bankruptcy fraud under the process enhancement. Part III contends that allowing courts to apply the pro cess enhancement to bankruptcy fraud regardless of whether the de fendant violated an order and based solely on a desire for proportion ate sentencing undermines the policy of the Guidelines. Part IV argues that courts that wish to punish a bankruptcy fraud defendant's abuse of process should sentence bankruptcy fraud under section 2Jl.3, the Guidelines' base offense provision for perjury, instead of under section 2Fl.1. This Note concludes that sentencing bankruptcy fraud defendants under section 2Jl.3, as opposed to adopting a broad definition of "process" in section 2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) or applying the pro vision by analogy, would best fulfill the Sentencing Commission's goals of uniform and proportional sentencing. A majority of the circuits that have examined the application of the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud have read the word "process" broadly and interpreted the phrase "violation of process" to mean abuse of process.31 These courts have held that reading "proc ess" in the process enhancement broadly to include submitting a false cide the issue because the defendant's conduct was more appropriately punished under the enhancement provision for abusing a position of trust This Part analyzes the abuse of process argument as a basis for ap plying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Section I.A dis cusses why the text of the process enhancement would favor reading "process" narrowly rather than broadly. Section I.B argues that the commentary to the process enhancement contradicts the inference that the Sentencing Commission intended "violation of any judicial ... process" to mean abuse of process. This Part concludes that both the text of and the commentary to the process enhancement support the position that the Sentencing Commission intended the process en hancement to be applied only to misconduct in contravention of a court or administrative order or decree.
An analysis of the text of the process enhancement demonstrates several flaws in the majority's logic. First, the use of "violation" in the phrase "violation of any judicial or administrative ... process" indi cates that process should be read narrowly. The word "violation" "strongly suggests the existence of a command or warning followed by disobedience."34 Courts, for example, commonly describe conduct in contravention of a preexisting court order as a violation. 35 By contrast, the conduct that courts characterize as an abuse of process focuses more on the misuse of the power and time of the court rather than a violation of a particular rule. 37 Other examples of abuses of process include use of pleadings to coerce payment of a debt or surrender of property un related to the litigation, unreasonable use of force or excessive at tachment to enforce a right of action, use of process to gain a collat eral advantage extraneous to the merits, and improper use of a subpoena.38 Thus, disrupting "process" in its broad sense would be more appropriately described as an abuse rather than a violation.
Reading "process" in the process enhancement broadly would also contravene the restrictive language in the process enhancement that indicates that the provision only covers violations of process "not ad dressed elsewhere in the guidelines."39 Section 3Cl.1 provides an en hancement for obstruction of justice, including the submission of false documents to a court.4 0 Many courts have applied section 3Cl.1 to enhance the sentences of defendants who have submitted false docu ments in the context of a formal hearing.41 Bankruptcy fraud involves to accomplish"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 10 (defining "abuse of proc ess"). 39. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.l{b){4)(B). The commentary to section 2Fl.1 reiterates that the process enhancement provision "does not apply to conduct addressed elsewhere in the guidelines." Id. § 2Fl.1 application note 6.
40. See id. § 3Cl.1 (providing an enhancement where "the defendant willful l y ob structed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense"). Applica tion notes 4{c) and 4(f) to section 3Cl.1 state that the provision applies to "producing or at tempting to produce a false, altered, or counterfeit document or record during an official investigation or judicial proceeding" and to "providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate." Id. an analogous abuse of process.42 Since reading "process" in the proc ess enhancement broadly would make section 3C1.1 redund ant, courts should interpret "process" narrowly. Moreover, where possible, stat utes should be read in a way to minimize the overlap between differ ent provisions.43
Finally, if the Sentencing Commission had meant to include abuse of process as a ground for enhancement, they would have used lan guage consistent with this intent. Congress, for example, regularly uses the term "abuse of process" in its statutes.44 Although the Sen tencing Commission does not use the term "abuse of process" in the Guidelines, it does use terms analogous to "abuse of process."45 Therefore, the use of the phrase "violation of process" by the Sen tencing Commission favors reading "process" narrowly.46
The commentary to the process enhancement, which consists of application notes and background , also indicates that the Sentencing Commission did not intend the process enhancement as a catchall provision to punish abuse of process.47 Commentary provides impor- 44. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (using "abuse of process"); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (us ing "obstruction of proceedings"); 19 U.S.C. § 1337( c) (using "abuse of process"); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a)(5)(B) (same).
45. See, e.g., USSG, supra note 3, § 3Cl.1 (applying to obstruction of justice); id. § 2J1.2 (same); see also id. § 2Jl.2 background (using "obstructing a civil or administrative pro ceeding"); id. § 3Cl.1 application note 4(c) (listing "producing or attempting to produce a false, altered, or counterfeit document or record during [a] ... judicial proceeding" as an obstruction of justice); id. application note 4(f) (listing "providing materially false informa tion to a judge or magistrate"). Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 799-801 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that while the section adj usts the offense level based on a violation of judicial process, "abuse" of process seems to have crept into the lexicon of the process enhancement through the case law of other circuits).
47. Most courts that have held that section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) applies to bankruptcy fraud have not examined the background or application notes to the provision. See, e.g. , United
States v. Guthrie, 144 F.3d 1006, 1010 (6th Cir. 1998) (electing to follow the majority position tant guidance in interpreting the Guidelines' provisions.48 The Su preme Court has held that commentary "must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula tion' " and that even unambiguous provisions should be applied in light of commentary. 49 Unfortunately, many of the courts that have held that section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) applies to bankruptcy fraud have not examined the background or application notes to the provision. 50
Application notes constitute one type of commentary.5 1 The appli cation notes to the process enhancement indicate that it should be used to increase the sentences of defendants who commit fraud that violates a preexisting legal instrument proscribing the misconduct.5 2 Application note 6 states that courts should apply the process en hancement "[i]f it is established that an entity the defendant con trolled was a party to the prior proceeding, and the defendant had knowledge of the prior decree or order."5 3 As an illustration, the ap plication note refers to "a defendant whose business was previously enjoined from selling a dangerous product, but who nonetheless en gaged in fraudulent conduct to sell the product," as an individual whose sentence should be enhanced under this provision.5 4 This ex ample reinforces the conclusion that the process enhancement should because it found the reasoning of these courts to be persuasive); United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding the more reasonable interpretation of judicial process to include judicial proceedings despite acknowledging that "a textual argument may be made that the term 'process' refers only to 'a specific judicial mechanism such as a sub be used only if the defend ant has acted in contravention of an admin istrative or court decree or order.ss Moreover, the absence of any other examples or discussion in the application notes regarding when courts should apply the process en hancement bolsters the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission meant to limit application of the provisions to situations in which a de fendant has violated a court or administrative order or decree.s6 If the Commission had intended the provision to cover abuse of process, it would have incorporated examples in the commentary indicative of this intent.s7 The failure of the Sentencing Commission to include such examples in the application notes to the process enhancement suggests that it did not intend abuse of process to fall within the pur view of this provision.ss
In addition, where the Sentencing Commission intends the applica tion notes to provide an illustrative but nonbinding interpretation of a provision, it usually expresses this intent explicitly. 59 The application notes to section 3Cl.l, for example, repeatedly indicate that the enu merated exa mples should not be considered exhaustive.60 By contrast, the application note to the process enhancement does not contain any such qualification.61 The Sentencing Commission's inclusion of discus sion related only to violations of court orders or decrees in the appli cation notes to the process enhancement indicates that it intend ed for courts to apply the provision only when a defendant violates an order or decree.62
55. See id. The November 1, 1993 amendment to application note 6 also supports this conclusion. The amendment states that "[t]his subsection does not apply to conduct ad dressed elsewhere in the Guidelines; e.g., a violation of a condition of release or a violation of probation." Id. § 2Fl.1, 1993 amendments (reference omitted). That the Sentencing Commission chose as examples two provisions related to violations of legal instruments is sued by courts, as opposed to provisions punishing abuses of process, suggests that the Commission had legal instruments in mind when it used the word "process" in this context. 56. See generally id. § 2Fl.1 application notes, background (giving only example and discussion that would support the narrow reading of "process").
57. The Sentencing Commission has explicitly used language analogous to abuse of pro cess in other parts of the Guidelines. See supra note 45.
58. See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.7.
59. See, e.g., id. § 3El.1 application note 1 (indicating that the list includes appropriate but not exclusive factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to apply the provision); id. § 2Fl.1 application note 5 (listing "[e]xamples of conduct to which this factor applies" in order to demonstrate the scope of section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(A)); id. § 2G2.l applica tion note 2 (indicating that enumerated entities should be considered examples of parties subject to this enhancement).
60. See id. § 3Cl.1 application note 3 (stating that application notes 4 and 5 only set forth examples); id. application note 4 (stating that application note 4 sets out a "non exhaustive list of examples").
61. See id. § 2Fl.l application note 6. 62 See id. § lBl.7 (stating that "commentary .
•. may interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied").
A second type of commentary is the background, which also pro vides important guidance in interpreting the Guidelines' provisions.63 The background to the process enhancement buttresses the conclusion that the Sentencing Commission intended courts to apply this provi sion only where a defendant violates a formal legal instrument issued by a court. The Sentencing Commission indicated in the background to section 2Fl.1 that it included the process enhancement specifically to deter recidivist criminal misconduct, particularly in situations where courts have previously disciplined the defendant.64 Thus, the back ground to the process enhancement also supports the use of this provi sion to punish defendants who have violated a court order, and not simply to punish defendants for abuse of process.
Further evidence of the Sentencing Commission's intent can be found in its narrow use of "process" in similar contexts in the com mentary. The commentary, for example, speaks of "judicial process or orders issued by federal, state, or local administrative agencies.''65
Moreover, the placement of "process" in section 2F1.1(b )(4)(B) at the end of an enumeration that includes only specific types of judicial in struments issued after a formal proceeding reinforces the conclusion that "process" should be read to include only judicial instruments similar to "orders," "injunctions," or "decrees."66 Of course, the Sen tencing Commission might have intended "process" as a catchall term, 63. See, e.g. , id. (stating that commentary may be used to interpret a "guideline or ex plain how it is to be applied" and "provide background information, including factors con sidered in promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulgation of the guideline" (emphasis added)); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (stating that "[i]n determining whether a cir cumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall consider only the sen tencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commis sion").
64. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 background (stating that "[a] defendant who has been subject to civil or administrative proceedings for the same or similar fraudulent con duct demonstrates aggravated criminal intent and is deserving of additional punishment").
65. Id.; see also id. § 5Dl.3(c)(4) (stating that the defendant should comply with "the terms of any court order or administrative process"). But see USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 background (stating that "[d]iplomatic processes often must be used to secure testimony and evidence").
66. The canons ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis indicate that, absent language or commentary to the contrary, the specific enumeration in section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) restricts the meaning of process. "Under the principle of ejusdem generis, when a general term follows a specific one, the general term should be understood as a reference to subjects akin to the one with specific enumeration." Norfolk & W. Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991). The canon noscitur a sociis holds that the meaning of a word in a series is affected by other words in the same series. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 694 (1995). Statutes commonly use "process" as a catchall term for legal instruments issued by a court in the context of a proceeding. See, e.g. , 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994) (discussing a court-issued "order, process, or judgment"); 15 U.S.C. § 260a(c) (discussing judicial action "by writ of injunction or by other process, man datory or otherwise, restraining against further violations"); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(2) (stating that courts may "issue such warrants or other process as may be required for enforcement"). [Vol. 98:1038 making the broader definition of "process" more reasonable.67 The similarity of the instruments enumerated on the list, however, supports the conclusion that even a catchall term should be limited by the common characteristics of the instruments mentioned by the Sen tencing Commission. 68
In sum, the Sentencing Commission's use of "process" in the proc ess enhancement reflects its intent to define the term narrowly.69 Moreover, the commentary to the process enhancement discusses "process" exclusively in its narrow sense.70 As such, courts should ap ply the process enhancement only when a defendant violates an order, injunction, decree, or a process issued by the court, such as a summ ons or mandate, not when a defendant engages in any conduct that can be described as abuse of process.
II. THE AN ALOGY ARGUMENT FOR APPLYING SECTION 2Fl.1(b)(4)(B) TOBANKRUPTCYFRAUD
Several federal courts have relied on the analogy argument as a justification for enhancing the sentences of bankruptcy fraud defen dants under the process enhancement.71 They have concluded that a defendant who commits bankruptcy fraud falls under the judicial pro cess language of the process enhancement, not because he has violated a court order, but because he has committed acts analogous to violat ing a court order or decree.72 These courts have equated several bank ruptcy rules and forms that mandate truthful and complete disclosure of assets and liabilities by debtors to court orders or decrees. incomplete disclosure to be tantamount to violating a judicial process within the meaning of the process enhancement.74
This Part analyzes the analogy argument for applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. Section II.A discusses why neither the text of nor the commentary to the process enhancement indicates that the Sentencing Commission intended that courts should have the discretion to apply it by analogy. Section II.B argues that courts should not apply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud be cause fraudulent filing of bankruptcy disclosure forms does not mani fest the necessary aggravated criminal intent to apply the process en hancement.
Section 11.C contends that applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud constitutes impermissible double counting. This Part concludes that the analogy argument is an insuffi cient justification for applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud.
A. The Text of and Commentary to Section2Fl.l(b)(4)(B)
The Sentencing Commission created the sentencing framework of the Guidelines to reduce judicial discretion and idiosyncratic sentenc ing decisions.75 As such, the Guidelines should generally be applied as written.76 This Section argues that courts should not apply the process enhancement by analogy because neither the text of nor the commen tary to the process enhancement manifests an intent to allow judicial discretion to do so.
The process enhancement contains no language that manifests any intention of conferring discretion on courts to apply the provision to misconduct analogous to violations of judicial orders or decrees. 75. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A{3) (stating that broad discretion results in courts "exercis[ing] their discretionary powers in different ways" and causes "the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission to reduce").
76. See id. ch. 1, pt. A(l) (stating that the Sentencing Commission promulgated "de tailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes"); id. ch. 1, pt. A(2) (stating that "sentencing court[s] must select a sentence from within the guideline range" except in atypical cases); see also supra note 9.
77. Compare, e.g. , USSG, supra note 3, § 2X5.1 ("If the offense is a felony or Class A misdemeanor for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, apply the most analo gous offense guideline."); id. § 2M1.1(a)(2) (directing courts to apply "the offense level ap plicable to the most analogous offense"); id. § 2K1.4(c)(l) ("If death resulted, or the offense was intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, apply the most analogous guideline from Chapter Two, Part A . ... ") ;id. § 211.1 (referencing section 2X5.1).
[Vol. 98:1038 have enunciated a wider range of relevant circumstances where courts should apply the process enhancement or could have used broader language in the text of the provision.78 Moreover, even if similar to court orders, preexisting disclosure forms should not be read into the language of the process enhancement because the section specifically lists several types of legal documents but omits general disclosure forms.79
In fact, where the Sentencing Commission intends to give sen tencing courts discretion to apply a provision by analogy, the commen tary typically reflects this intent.80 The commentary to section 3C1.1, for example, states that "[o]bstructive conduct can vary widely in na ture, degree of planning, and seriousness" and offers examples to "as sist the court in determining whether application of this adjustment is warranted in a particular case."81 Where the text and commentary do not indicate that the Sentencing Commission intended to allow a pro vision to be applied by analogy, sentencing courts should apply the Guidelines as written. 84. USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl .1 background; see also Shadduck, 112 F.3d at 529 (stating that a defendant demonstrates aggravated criminal intent by "violating a prior order specifi cally enjoining the defendant ... from engaging in the fraudulent conduct" (emphasis re moved)); United States v. Carrozzella, 105 F.3d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that applica tion of the process enhancement is limited to situations in which defendants "commit their fraud in the face of some type of official warning or order directed specifically to them");
Linville, 10 F.3d at 633 (finding aggravated criminal intent where the defendant violates a "special law in the form of a formal order, injunction or decree"). 87. See Sha dduck, 112 F.3d at 530 (stating that not all bankruptcy fraud cases involve aggravated criminal intent); Carrozzella, 105 F.3d at 800 (stating that bankruptcy fraud de fendants who are trustees do not demonstrate aggravated criminal intent because the "com mand" they violate is "not specifically directed" at them).
88. See, e.g. , Oymer v. United States, No. 95-55941, 1996 WL 393510, at *l (9th Cir. July 9, 1996) (listing the elements of bankruptcy fraud as "(1) the existence of bankruptcy pro ceedings; (2) that the defendant made a statement in the bankruptcy proceeding under pen alty of perjury; (3) that the statement was false; (4) that the statement pertained to a mate rial fact; and (5) that the statement was knowingly and fraudulently made" (citing 18 U.S.C. § 152)). The fraudulent filing of generalized disclosure forms lacks many of the characteristics that make violating a court order or decree a crime cation than with orders of the court .... "); Shadduck, 112 F.3d at S29-30 {lack of specificity of the bankruptcy court's disclosure requirements prevent finding of aggravated intent for violation of such existing rules); Carrozzella, lOS F.3d at 800 {full disclosure requirement not specifically directed at the defendant); United States v. Gunderson, SS F.3d 1328, 1333 (7th Cir. 199S) (upholding enhancement where defendant violates a "court-directed course of conduct" rather than "general laws against fraudulent conduct"). Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 (noting that the defendant had violated a court order proscribing his conduct); United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 88S (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that the de· fondant had held himself out as an attorney in violation of a court order that had been issued by a judge in the course of an earlier critninal trial of the defendant).
9S. See Carrozzella, lOS F.3d at 800 (interpreting the enhancement to apply only to those defendants who act in contravention of an existing order); Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 (noting the importance of the defendant's having a previous warning); see also USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl .1 background (stating that "[a] defendant who has been subject to civil or ad· ministrative proceedings for the same or sitnilar fraudulent conduct demonstrates aggra· vated critninal intent" because he has "not conform [ed] with the requirements of judicial process or orders").
96. Th ayer, 201 F.3d at 228; see also United States v. Mohammad, S3 F.3d 1426, 1437 {7th Cir. 199S) (stating that the court had ordered the defendant not to sell assets).
97. See Burke, 125 F.3d at 40S (stating that the defendant had not only sold fraudulent securities but had also committed the separate offense of doing so in contravention of a con· sent decree); Gunderson, SS F.3d at 1333 (stating that a defendant shows aggravated criminal intent where he "defies a specific court-directed course of conduct").
of aggravated criminal intent.98 In most cases, parties voluntarily complete bankruptcy disclosure forms and voluntarily file them with the court.99 The disclosure forms consist of generic documents with generalized warnings given to all individuals filing for bankruptcy.100 Such forms generally do not emanate from a formal hearing where the court has compelled the attendance of the party seeking to file bank ruptcy.101 Moreover, the bankruptcy rules and forms do not "indicate in specific terms what ... parties are required to do."102
The bankruptcy disclosure forms do require the filer to sign a dec laration under penalty of perjury as to the truthfulness of the matters within the petition.103 Such a declaration, standing alone, however, does not provide these documents with the gravity of court orders in this context because it involves neither the formalities surrounding the issuance of a court order or decree, nor a specific command from the court not to engage in a particular course of conduct.104 The declara tion and signature simply create and inform the declarant of a legal obligation.105 Thus, courts have not applied the process enhancement to the fraudulent filing of generalized forms such as tax returns and employment-eligibility verification forms that require a similar decla-98. See, e.g. , Linville, 10 F.3d at 632-33 (holding that defendanfs violation of USDA letters and notice warning her to cease her violation did not merit the process enhancement because they did not involve formalities analogous to those used by the court in issuing a court order); United States v. Scarano, g-]5 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that gener alized bail conditions do not constitute judicial orders within the meaning of the process en hancement). Cir. 19g-] ).
[Vol. 98:1038 ration..1 06 Applying the process enhancement to violations of general disclosure forms would "subject every recipient of ... official notifica tions and warnings" to a penalty that the Sentencing Commission in tended to reserve for acts of fraud committed \v ith an "aggravated criminal intent.m07
The application of the aggravated criminal intent standard in non bankruptcy contexts buttresses the conclusion that courts should not use the process enhancement to punish all bankruptcy fraud defen dants. Outside of the bankruptcy context, courts have found the req uisite aggravated criminal intent where the defendant violates a pre existing court order or some other legal instrument.108 The Second Circuit, for example, upheld application of the process enhancement to the sentence of a defendant who repeatedly represented himself as a lawyer despite a court order prohibiting him from perpetrating this fraud.109 By contrast, criminals who violate a nonspecific prohibition such as generalized bail conditions or Un ited States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") warnings have been held to lack aggravated criminal intent.110 These cases draw a distinction between the criminal intent of a defendant who violates a generalized warning that applies to a broad range of people, and a specific order, decree, or process that is directed specifically at the defendant and involves a previous finding by the court that the defendant engaged in fraudulent con duct.111 Nor do the serious ramifications of the abuse of process caused by bankruptcy fraud, standing alone, demonstrate aggravated criminal intent. Many courts that have held fraudulent filing of bankruptcy forms to be punishable under 2Fl.1(b)(4) (B) argue that the crime demonstrates a higher level of culpability than other types of fraud be cause of its serious ramifications.112 The commentary to the process enhancement, however, indicates that the provision should be used to punish recidivist conduct that manifests the requisite mens rea, not simply fraud with serious ramifications.113 Thus, even a defendant who commits bankruptcy fraud with an awareness of the impact of his crime on the bankruptcy system does not exhibit aggravated criminal intent within the meaning of the process enhancement, unless he does so in violation of a judicial order, decree, or process.114
In sum, the process enhancement should only be invoked where the defendant commits a fraud despite an order issued by a court or an administrative entity directing him to cease the misconduct.115 Bank ruptcy fraud involves a knowingly false statement related to a material fact made under penalty of perjury and in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding.116 It does not necessarily involve aggravated criminal in tent. Of course, violating the rules and forms of the bankruptcy court is a reprehensible crime worthy of punishment.117 Courts should, how ever, refrain from enhancing the defendant's sentence under the proc ess enhancement unless the defendant demonstrates the "aggravated criminal intent which [the enhancement] was designed to redress."118 Therefore, unless a bankruptcy judge enters a pertinent order, decree, or inj unction directing a party to disclose property, merely violating 113. See USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 application note 6 (stating that section 2Fl.l(b)(4)(B) should be applied "[i]f it is established that an entity the defendant con trolled was a party to the prior proceeding, and the defendant had knowledge of the prior decree or order, this provision applies even if the defendant was not a specifically named party in that prior case"); supra note 64; see also United States v. Shadduck, 112 F.3d 523, 530 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that the commentary requires knowledge of the prior order or decree).
114. See, e.g. , USSG, supra note 3, § 2Fl.1 application note 6 (stating that the provision applies to a party with knowledge of the prior decree or order); Shadduck, 112 F.3 d at 530 (stating that the defendant needs the required "mens rea"); Linville, 10 F.3d at 633 (de scribing aggravated criminal intent as a "mental state"). Many courts, however, apply the enhancement without ever considering the defendant's mental state. See [Vol. 98:1038 the general rules or forms of the bankruptcy court does not create a sufficient basis to adjust a defendant's sentence upward under the pro cess enhancement.119
C. The Analogy Argument Permits Double Counting
Double counting occurs when a court sentences a defendant or en hances the sentence of a defendant under one provision of the Guide lines, and subsequently enhances the defendant's sentence based on the same conduct punished in the first instance.120 This Section exam ines the problem of double counting in sentencing and argues that courts double count when they enhance a bankruptcy fraud defen dant's sentence under section 2F.1(b)(4)(B) for abuse of the bank ruptcy process.
The Guidelines implicitly prohibit double counting.121 In a general sense, double counting would conflict with the Guidelines' goal of honest and proportional sentencing by allowing courts to punish the defendant several times for the same misconduct.122 The policy state ments to the Guidelines, for example, speak of the "defendant's actual conduct" as imposing a "natural limit" on a defendant's sentence.123 Specific provisions within the Guidelines also reflect this intent.124 A court sentencing a defendant under the obstruction of justice base of fense, for example, may only apply the obstruction enhancement where the defendant's obstructive conduct is so aggravated that it ex- 123. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(4)(a).
124. See, e.g. , id. § 2Jl.3 application note 3 (stating that where the defendant is convicted for both perjury and the "underlying offense," the court should ensure that such treatment does not impermissibly double count); id. § 3Dl.2 application note 5 (stating that "[s]ubsection (c) provides that when conduct that represents a separate count •.
• is also a specific offense characteristic in or other adjustment to another count, the count represented by that conduct is to be grouped with the count to which it constitutes an aggravating fac tor ... [to prevent] 'double counting' of offense behavior"); id. § 5K2.7 policy statement (proscribing departures for actions inherent to the underlying offense).
ceeds that necessary to satisfy the basic elements of the underlying of fense.125
Not surprisingly, many courts have interpreted the Guidelines to prohibit double counting unless the Sentencing Commission has ex pressed a contrary intent.126 In Un ited States v. Greenfield, for exam ple, the Second Circuit held that enhancing a defendant's sentence for a leadership role, under section 3Bl.l, and for more than minimal planning, under section 2F1.l(b )(2), constituted double counting be cause the court based both enhancements on the same conduct.127 Likewise, many courts have also interpreted the Guidelines to require that an enhancement relate to conduct beyond the essential elements of the base offense.128
Applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud by analo gizing the defendant's failure to accurately disclose assets to a viola tion of a court order constitutes impermissible double counting. The central element of bankruptcy fraud consists of the knowing and fraudulent concealment of assets from the bankruptcy court.129 This nondisclosure is the conduct that several courts have analogized to violating a court order in order to apply the process enhancement.130
125. See id. § 3Cl.1 application note 7 (stating that defendant's conduct should manifest obstruction exceeding that inherent in the underlying offense). [Vol. 98:1038 In Un ited States v. Bellew,131 for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of bankruptcy fraud for "conceal[ing] assets by know ingly failing to list the assets in bankruptcy filings and knowingly fail ing to disclose the assets during bankruptcy hearings."132 The Elev enth Circuit subsequently upheld an upward adjustment of the defendant's sentence under the process enhancement for failing to dis close assets to the bankruptcy court by relying on the analogy argu ment.133 Thus, the court's application of the process enhancement in Bellew double counted the defendant's failure to disclose assets to the bankruptcy court.
Although some courts have held that the Guidelines allow double counting where neither of the relevant provisions contains language proscribing the practice, they have limited this exception to separate enhancement provisions.134 Thus, courts engage in double counting where both the fraud charge and the process enhancement stem from a defendant's failure to disclose assets in a bankruptcy proceeding. 135 The only conduct that arguably falls under the process enhancement, defendant's fraudulent submission of disclosure documents, also forms the basis for the underlying fraud charge. Therefore, permitting courts to enhance the defendant's sentence based on this conduct would allow double counting in contravention of the intent of the Sen tencing Commission as manifested in the Guidelines. Cir. 1996) (stating that "[n]othing in the Guidelines indicates that § 3Bl.3 and § 2Fl.l{b){3){B) may not be applied in tandem"); United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670-71 {3d Cir. 1993) (holding that two en hancements may be applied to the same conduct unless the Guidelines explicitly state oth erwise); United States v. Rappaport, 999 F.2d 57, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1993) {finding that en hancement of defendant's sentence under both USSG, § 3Bl.l{a) and USSG, § 2Fl.l{b){2){A) was not double counting because the enhancements addressed different as pects of the defendant's misconduct); United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 418-19 {8th Cir. 1993) {finding no double counting unless Guidelines forbid application of two sections). None of these cases, however, address the propriety of double counting via an enhancement provision punishing conduct accounted for in the base offense. Compare Lamere, 980 F.2d at 517 (reversing an enhancement).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 947 F.2d 339, 340 {8th Cir. 1991) (refusing to im pose a section 3Cl.1 enhancement for bankruptcy fraud because concealing assets formed the basis of the defendant's fraud charge); see also Rappap ort, 999 F.2d at 60-61 (stating that enhancements relate to conduct beyond that which underlies the base offense). But see United States v. Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1437 {7th Cir. 1995) {holding that application of the process enhancement to cases of bankruptcy fraud does not implicate double counting because the concealment forms the basis of the bankruptcy fraud charge, and the violation of "a specific judicial order or the judicial process" forms the basis of the enhancement).
ill . THE POLICY OF THE G UIDELINES
This Part examines the policy rationales used by those courts that rely on the abuse of process argument and the analogy argument to justify applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud. These courts have relied on a defendant's abuse of the bankruptcy process as a basis for applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud.136 Because the process enhancement does not encompass abuse of proc ess, though, this factor cannot justify application of the enhancement provision to bankruptcy fraud. Moreover, relying on such utilitarian justifications contravenes the underlying policy of the Guidelines. This Part concludes that Congress or the Sentencing Commission, and not courts, should remedy any problems with the Guidelines.
Many courts have justified applying the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud because they claim that, unlike most fraud crimes, bankruptcy fraud inherently involves abuse of process.137 These courts consider a defendant's abuse of the bankruptcy process as a material characteristic that differentiates bankruptcy fraud from other section 2F1.1 fraud crimes.138 Bankruptcy fraud, unlike many other forms of fraud, wastes judicial resources, hinders the administration of the bankruptcy estate, and misuses the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court.139 Section 2F1 .1, however, does not include any enhancement provision that specifically punishes abuse of process.140
The absence of an enhancement that accounts for this difference has troubled these judges not only because it violates their innate sense of fairness but also because they feel that it subverts the Guide lines' goal of proportional sentencing.141 One court characterized sec tion 2F1.1 as "a dragnet guideline that sweeps within its ambit a great number of offenses involving dishonesty ... that impact our society in a variety of ways."142 Without the process enhancement, defendants convicted of bankruptcy fraud would be subj ect to the same sentence 142 Id. at 331.
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as criminals who have committed fraud crimes that do not involve abuse of process.143
Courts may also perceive a specific enhancement directed at such abuse of process to be an important deterrent, especially in light of the rapid spread of bankruptcy fraud. The Tenth Circuit in Un ited States v. Messner,144 for example, characterized the process enhancement as essential to "protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system."145 These considerations probably served as the impetus for courts to ap ply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud and explain its con tinuing application.146
The policy statements to the Guidelines, however, undermine this justification for applying the Guidelines in a way that contravenes the intent of the Sentencing Commission.147 Policy statements comprise an important tool in interpreting the Guidelines.148 In fact, the Su preme Court has held that prohibitive policy statements should be treated as "an authoritative guide to the meaning of the applicable Guideline. "149
The policy statements to the Guidelines indicate that the Commis sion imposed the rigid structure of the Guidelines to curb judicial dis cretion, to eliminate variations in the administration of sentences, and to maintain the balance it established between these competing goals.150 As part of the balance, Congress recognized the importance of preserving "sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices."151 The Sentencing Commission, however, carefully cabined the discretion 150. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3) ("The Commission had to balance the com parative virtues and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed, complex subcategori zation, and within the constraints established by that balance, minimize the discretionary powers of the sentencing court.").
that it allowed in the Guidelines.152 Rather than granting courts broad discretion to account for such factors, the Commission built flexibility into the Guidelines by creating a detailed system that included "a list of relevant distinctions" for courts to invoke where necessary to guar antee appropriately diff erent sentences for criminal conduct of differ ing severity.153 Thus, in order to effectuate the intent of the Sentenc ing Commission, the Guidelines must be applied as written.154
Allowing sentencing courts to misapply Guidelines' provisions to achieve just ends would give courts the very discretion that the Sen tencing Commission sought to minimize in enacting the Guidelines.155 Reading "process" broadly in the process enhancement, for example, would create the type of "simple, broad category" rejected by the Sen tencing Commission in drafting the Guidelines.156 Abuse of process includes any misuse of judicial or administrative proceedings, includ ing filing baseless complaints, making false representations to courts or agencies, and perhaps even filing false tax returns.157 Because of the breadth of the term and its imprecise definition, diff erent courts might apply the term inconsistently.158 "Granting such broad discretion" to sentencing courts would result in sentencing disparities and "would 152 See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (stating that Congress created the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Commission to combat the "perceptionD that federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with sinillar histories, convicted of sinillar crimes, committed under sinillar circumstances" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Commission viewed broad judicial discretion as adverse to uniformity and proportionality because it increased the likelihood that different courts would interpret and apply the Guidelines in different ways. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3).
153. USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3); see id. ch. 1, pt. A(4) (b). The Sentencing Commission also allows for two other forms of judicial discretion. Where courts perceive a relevant distinction not reflected in the Guidelines, courts may depart from the Guidelines' sentencing procedure. See id.; see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996) (stating that the court should depart when circumstances take a case "out of the Guideline's heartland"). Departure, however, should be reserved for the rare instances in which a court encounters a case with characteristics so unusual that the Sentencing Commission probably did not account for them in drafting the Guidelines. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. The Sen tencing Commission also occasionally expresses its intent to give sentencing courts discretion in the text or commentary of Guidelines' provisions. See id. Despite realizing the need for some judicial discretion, the Commission still sought to "minimize the discretionary powers of the sentencing court" in the sentencing process. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(3). [be] contrary to the Commission's mandate."159 The ambiguity created by reading the process enhancement broadly, for example, has led to conflicting decisions, even within the same circuit, as to whether or not to apply the process enhancement to bankruptcy fraud.160 Although reading "process" narrowly would not completely eliminate judicial discretion, it would minimize it.
Allowing courts to apply the process enhancement by analogy would also violate the intent of the drafters. It would require courts to make the typ e of discretionary decisions that the Guidelines were de signed to minimize.161 A court sentencing a bankruptcy defendant, for example, would need to decide whether the underlying crime consists of conduct analogous to a violation of a court order and then, [a]ttempts, in effect, to manipulate the Guidelines in order to achieve the 'right result' in a given case are inconsistent with the Guidelines' goal of creating uniformity in sentencing"). Although such attempts to reach a just sentence might promote individualized sentencing, they would alter the balance between proportionality and uniformity established by the Sen tencing Commission. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3).
168. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt A(3). 173. See USSG, supra note 3, ch. 1, pt. A(2) .
[Vol. 98:1038 their opinions.174 If the Sentencing Commission intends to provide an enhancement for the abuse of process inherent in bankruptcy fraud, then it will revise the Guidelines to reflect this intent. 175 Until the Sentencing Commission makes such revisions, however, courts should apply the Guidelines as written.176 Gaps that courts per ceive in the sentencing scheme are "more appropriately a legislative concem."177 A contrary position would allow courts to apply the Guidelines based on ad hoc justifications or idiosyncratic motivations and present the very same risks as broad judicial discretion in terms of creating "the wide disparity that Congress established the Commission to reduce."178 It would also contravene the Sentencing Commission's intent of creating "detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sen tences for offenders convicted of federal crimes."179
IV. PERJURY AS AN AL TERNATIVE TO FRAUD
This Part examines the applicability of the Guidelines' base of fense provision for perjury to bankruptcy fraud. It argues that bank ruptcy fraud is more appropriately punished under the perjury provi sion than the fraud provision of the Guidelines. This Part concludes that punishing bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision would fa cilitate the Sentencing Commission's goals of uniform and proportion ate sentencing.
Many courts believe that sentencing bankruptcy fraud under the fraud provision without the process enhancement is problematic be cause the base sentence imposed by section 2Fl.1 does not reflect the severity of the defendant's abuse of process.180 As noted by the court in Lloyd, bankruptcy defendants violate the sanctity of bankruptcy proceedings by illegitimately seeking shelter from creditors and hin dering the orderly administration of the bankruptcy estate. 181 The rea soning of such courts highlights a potential shortcoming of sentencing bankruptcy fraud offenses under the fraud provision.182 Although the fraud provision accounts for a defendant's aggravated criminal intent, demonstrated by violating a court or administrative decree or order, it does not provide an enhancement that would punish bankruptcy fraud defendants for their abuse of process.183 This undermines the Guide lines' goal of proportional sentencing.
A plausible response to such concerns would be to sentence defen dants convicted of bankruptcy fraud under section 2J1.3, the Guide lines' base offense provision for perjury, instead of under section 2F1 .1, the fraud base offense provision.184 Sentencing bankruptcy fraud defendants under section 2J1.3 ("the perjury provision") would facilitate two separate goals of the Guidelines.185 Requiring courts to sentence bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision would promote uniformity, eliminating the division between the circuits as to the ap propriateness of the process enhancement. Sentencing bankruptcy de fendants under the perjury provision would also promote proportion ality by accounting for a defendant's abuse of process, a characteristic that diff erentiates bankruptcy fraud from fraud in general.
The Guidelines indicate that courts should sentence defendants under the base offense "most applicable to the offense of convic tion"186 and "most appropriate for the nature of the offense conduct charged."187 Bankruptcy fraud consists of any number of knowing or fraudulent representations or omissions made in the course of a bank ruptcy proceeding.188 In essence, bankruptcy fraud punishes the de fendant for "fraud upon the court."189 Perjury similarly punishes a de fendant's "deliberately making material false or misleading statements (Vol. 98:1038 while under oath."190 Most courts state that the abuse of process caused by the defendant's perjury, and not by the fraud, constitutes the "gravamen" of bankruptcy fraud. 191 In fact, the bankruptcy disclo sure forms indicate on their face that incomplete disclosure constitutes perjury.192 Thus, the perjury provision, not section 2F1 .1, would seem to be the base offense provision most applicable to bankruptcy fraud. 193 The few cases that have examined the applicability of the perjury provision to the crime of bankruptcy fraud, however, have chosen not to apply it to bankruptcy fraud. 194 The courts in these cases have based their conclusion primarily on their characterization of bank ruptcy fraud as a "fraud."195 The court in Un ited States v. Kaster for example, although upholding the sentencing of a defendant convicted of bankruptcy fraud under the perjury provision of the Guidelines, in dicated in dicta that it would not reach the same conclusion in most bankruptcy cases where defendants "do not disclose their assets" be cause they "want to maintain their interest in those assets at the ex pense of their creditors."196
Several factors favor the application of the perjury provision to bankruptcy fraud despite this precedent. First, an examination of the reasoning of these courts reveals a subtle, yet material, misapprehen sion of the nature of bankruptcy fraud.197 Congress's definition of bankruptcy fraud, as well as that of most courts, centers on the defen dant's deception of the bankruptcy court. 198 The courts that have con cluded that bankruptcy fraud should be sentenced under the Guide lines' fraud provision, however, have relied on the defendant's deception of creditors.199 Because Congress and most courts view bankruptcy fraud primarily as a fraud on the court rather than a fraud on creditors, the perjury provision is the most appropriate provision for sentencing bankruptcy fraud defendants.
Moreover, the commentary to section 2Fl.1 indicates that where a fraud-based crime is subj ect to divergent characterizations, the court should apply a provision other than section 2Fl.1 if it "more aptly cover[s] " the offense of conviction.200 Courts, for example, punish false statements to customs officials under section 2T3 .1, the Guide lines' provision for false statements to customs officials, and not under section 2Fl.1, despite the fact that such conduct could easily be char acterized as a fraud. 201 The Sentencing Commission's 1990 amend ment of the Statutory Index to include section 2J1 .3 for sentencing bankruptcy fraud indicates the Commission's approval of the perjury provision as an appropriate alternative to section 2Fl.l. 202 By applying the perjury provision, courts would no longer have to manipulate the process enhancement in order to impose proportional sentences. Since perjury inherently involves abuse of process, sen tencing defendants under the perjury provision would obviate the typ e of policy concerns driving courts to enhance the sentences of bank ruptcy fraud defendants under the process enhancement.203 At the same time, bankruptcy fraud defendants would receive longer sen tences under the perjury provision than under section 2F1.1, reflecting the importance of protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy process.204 Moreover, such an approach would reserve the process enhancement for the type of crimes that the Sentencing Commission intended the process to apply to, namely those involving defendants who demon strate aggravated criminal intent in perpetrating a fraud by violating a court or administrative order or decree.
Thus, sentencing courts should apply the perjury provision because perjury constitutes the "gravamen" of bankruptcy fraud. Applying the perjury provision would allow courts to impose on bankruptcy fraud defendants the sentences that account for the harm they wreak on the bankruptcy system while providing for a uniform system of sentencing bankruptcy fraud.
CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy fraud constitutes an emerging epidemic in the federal criminal justice system. While bankruptcy fraud wastes judicial re sources and undermines the integrity of the bankruptcy system,205 such negative consequences do not give courts free rein to interpret the Guidelines' provisions, such as the process enhancement, as they see fit. Although Congress and the Sentencing Commission intended to create a flexible sentencing system, responsive to the multitude of sce narios that courts might face, courts do not have unlimited discretion.
203.
See, e.g. , Kas ter, 1998 WL 78995, at *2 (finding that defendant's "actions most harmed the integrity of the court and, therefore, more resembleD perjury than fraud"). Some bankruptcy fraud defendants would also qualify for a section 2Jl.3(b )(2) enhancement for substantial interference with the administration of justice, depending on the stage of the bankruptcy proceeding at which the government discovers their fraud. See id. at *1 (sen tence of bankruptcy fraud defendant enhanced under § 2Jl.3(b)(2)). This enhancement punishes conduct that, among other circumstances, results in "any judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence." USSG, supra note 3, § 2Jl.3 application note 1.
204. The Guidelines also direct that where more than one Guidelines' provision is appli cable to a given crime, the provision that results in the "greater offense level" should be used. See USSG, supra note 3, § lBl.1 application note 5. The perjury provision is arguably the more appropriate provision because it will more often result in the greater offense level. The base offense level for fraud is 6. See id. § 2Fl.1. Under the perjury provision, the de fendant's base offense would be 12, and with the substantial interference with the admini stration of justice enhancement would reach 15. See id. § 2Jl.3. If loss, however, is factored in under the fraud provision, any loss over $200,000 will result in an enhancement of 8 (for a total level of 16) and make the fraud provision the harsher of the two provisions. See id. § 2Fl.1.
205.
See, e.g. , United States v. Messner, 107 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating that " [b] ankruptcy fraud undermines the whole concept of allowing a debtor to obtain protection from creditors, pay debts in accord with the debtor's ability and thereby obtain a fresh start"); Gaumer, supra note 2, at 12 (noting the special nature of bankruptcy proceedings).
